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Inverse View
It is not the case that Immanent realism can be extended to include dispositional or possible instantiation, not merely actual instantiation (following Armstrong's combinatorialism).
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Possible instantiation risks conflating abstract modal truths with concrete instantiation; immanent realism's strength lies in grounding only what actually exists.
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2.
Dispositional properties depend on categorical bases to be instantiated at all; extending realism to dispositions without clarity on grounding invites infinite regress.
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3.
Immanent realism loses its anti-Platonic advantage if it must posit unactualized possible instantiations as real constituents of the world.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Dispositional properties (fragility, solubility) are genuinely instantiated in objects; immanent realism should account for all real properties, not just categorical ones.
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2.
Armstrong's combinatorialism successfully grounds possibility in actual combinations of properties; extending immanent realism this way preserves metaphysical economy.
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3.
Modal language (what could happen) describes objective features of the world; immanent realism gains explanatory power by incorporating possible instantiation.
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