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    In asking for the cause of X's being, one cannot seek a m... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    In asking for the cause of X's being, one cannot seek a middle term between the subject and predicate of 'X is' or 'X is X' without first unpacking the judgment into one with distinct subject and predicate

    Philosophy of Language
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    Reasons For

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    • 1.A middle term can only be sought when the subject and predicate of a judgment are distinct
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    • 2.Judgments of the form 'X is' or 'X is X' do not have distinct subject and predicate until unpacked into a judgment about different things
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    • 3.Unpacking 'why is there an eclipse?' into 'why is the moon darkened at opposition?' yields a judgment with distinct subject and predicate and thereby allows a middle term to be sought
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageCausation

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    Key Terms

    being(Aristotle's rejection of being as a genus)
    The class that contains all and only things that exist; proposed candidate for a highest kind.
    cause(Philosophical definition of causation requiring both sufficiency and necessity of the cause relative to its effect)
    An event or state of things such that (a) if it happens or exists, the effect must happen or exist even if no further conditions are fulfilled, and (b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens or exists.
    judgment(Russell and Ramsey's multiple-relation theory of judgment)
    A multiple relation of the mind or mental factors to many objects — the constituents of the proposition judged — rather than a single relation to a single propositional object
    middle term(Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II,2)
    A term that mediates between the subject and predicate of a two-place judgment and serves as the cause explaining why the predicate belongs to the subject; its discovery constitutes scientific knowledge.
    predicate(Logical/grammatical ontology in Eisagoge)
    Either a sound signifying a meaning or a meaning signified by a certain sound
    subject(Logical/grammatical ontology in Eisagoge)
    Either a sound signifying a meaning or a meaning signified by a certain sound
    unpacking(as used in philosophical analysis)
    Breaking down a complex or compressed idea into smaller, simpler, more clearly separated parts so you can examine it better.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    A middle term can only be sought when the subject and predicate of a judgment ar...Judgments of the form 'X is' or 'X is X' do not have distinct subject and predic...Unpacking 'why is there an eclipse?' into 'why is the moon darkened at oppositio...

    Similar

    If X is simple, 'X is' cannot be unpacked into a judgment with distinc...87%Judgments of the form 'X is' or 'X is X' do not have distinct subject ...87%To discover why X is, one must reformulate the judgment 'X is' as a tw...85%If X has a simple quiddity, 'X is' cannot be expanded into a sentence ...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: al-farabi-metaphysics
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    In all of this Fârâbî is broadly following the Aristotelian idea that, for any composite object X, we can ask “what is X?” and answer the question either by giving a definition of X spelling X out into many in-some-sense-constituents of X, or by giving some one such constituent of X, which is a partial answer to “what is X?”.[28] Fârâbî is also following Aristotle in insisting that all of the things which should be mentioned in the definition of X are causes of X’s being (“the thing by which [
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

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    claim
    Perspectives
    1 (1 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit