Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    In paraconsistent logic, a necessarily false statement ma... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→The inference from □¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) to ¬◇K(p ∧ ¬Kp) may not be valid in paraconsistent logic

    In paraconsistent logic, a necessarily false statement may be both false and true at some world

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    If a statement is both necessarily false and true at some world, it is both nece...The inference from □¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) to ¬◇K(p ∧ ¬Kp) may not be valid in paraconsiste...Therefore, □¬p does not entail ¬◇p in paraconsistent logic, and counterexamples ...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Modality & Possibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.

    Similar

    If a statement is both necessarily false and true at some world, it is...86%Therefore, □¬p does not entail ¬◇p in paraconsistent logic, and counte...81%The inference from □¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) to ¬◇K(p ∧ ¬Kp) may not be valid in pa...81%The logic of closed sets is paraconsistent, supporting inconsistent no...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: fitch-paradox
    View source passageHide passage
    Notice that our presentation of Fitch’s reasoning makes no explicit mention of the assumption that \(Kp \wedge \neg Kp\) is impossible. So here we attempt to pinpoint exactly where Fitch’s reasoning goes wrong on the above account. It is claimed at line 9 (in the first section of this entry) that \(K(p \wedge \neg Kp)\) is impossible. Of course \(K(p \wedge \neg Kp)\) entails the contradiction \(Kp \wedge \neg Kp\). And so, if the reasoning is that \(K(p \wedge \neg Kp)\) is impossible because c

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective