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Inverse View
It is not the case that In pluralist societies, rival conceptions of virtue produce rival candidates for 'good person,' making the standard indeterminate rather than action-guiding.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Indeterminacy about *which* virtue matters most doesn't erase determinacy about *some* virtues—pluralists broadly agree cruelty is vice.
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2.
Action guidance doesn't require a single determinate ideal; it works via overlapping agreements and elimination of clear non-candidates.
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3.
Rival conceptions may produce different emphasis, not rival 'good persons'—most virtue frameworks share a common core (honesty, courage, justice).
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Pluralist societies host genuinely incompatible virtue frameworks (e.g., honor vs. humility, autonomy vs. duty) with no neutral arbiter.
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2.
When a standard picks no determinate referent, it cannot reliably guide action—people citing it will endorse contradictory conduct.
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3.
Empirically, pluralist citizens cannot agree on exemplars of virtue, suggesting 'good person' lacks shared extension.
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