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    In the case of the self, there is a single object that is... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    In the case of the self, there is a single object that is both a thing in itself and an appearance

    Consciousness & MindPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Many two object readers admit that the self is a thing in itself that appears to itself as a spatiotemporal object
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    • 2.This admission is consistent with a two object reading in the general case
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Allison's two-aspect reading requires that appearance and thing in itself are descriptions of the same object under different epistemic conditions, not ontologically distinct entities.
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    • 2.Granting the self a privileged dual-object status violates the transcendental unity Allison's framework demands, generating an ad hoc exception.
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    • 3.Systematic consistency requires that whatever metaphysical structure applies to the self applies equally to empirical objects, precluding special treatment for self-knowledge.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant explicitly argues in the Paralogisms that the 'I think' reveals no object at all, merely a logical subject of thought.
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    • 2.If the self yields no object through introspection, it cannot be a single object that is simultaneously appearance and thing in itself.
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Allison's two-aspect reading requires that appearance and thing in itself are de...Granting the self a privileged dual-object status violates the transcendental un...If the self yields no object through introspection, it cannot be a single object...Kant explicitly argues in the Paralogisms that the 'I think' reveals no object a...
    +3 moreShow less
    Many two object readers admit that the self is a thing in itself that appears to...Systematic consistency requires that whatever metaphysical structure applies to ...This admission is consistent with a two object reading in the general case

    Similar

    Many two object readers admit that the self is a thing in itself that ...82%The self is the substance that collates, organises, and compares the d...80%External objects (bodies) are merely appearances.79%The self is a different kind of entity from any physical body79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kant-transcendental-idealism
    View source passageHide passage
    The distinction between “one object” and “two object” readings comes down to the question of whether appearances, in general, are numerically identical to things in themselves: "one object" readers claim they are (Adickes 1924: 20, 27; Allais 2004: 657; Langton 1998: 13; Westphal 1968: 120), and "two object" readers deny this.[54] Whether all things in themselves are numerically identical to appearances is not at issue, for most one object readers will admit there could be things that never ap
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit