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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Inference is fully constituted by the logical relation between vyāpti (pervasion) and pakṣadharmatā (property residing in subject), without requiring any additional motivational state.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Recognition of vyāpti itself requires prior commitment to accept certain evidence; this committedness is motivational, not reducible to logical form alone.
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    • 2.Without desire for knowledge (jijñāsā), an agent perceives pakṣadharmatā but may fail to apply vyāpti; logical availability differs from inferential actualization.
      ?

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    • 3.The distinction between potential and activated inference suggests motivational states determine whether logical relations become operative acts of knowing.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Vyāpti (pervasion) is a determinate logical structure; if pakṣadharmatā instantiates it, inference follows necessarily without appeal to belief or desire.
      ?

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    • 2.Motivational states introduce subjective variability; inference's reliability depends on formal relations alone, not mental attitudes of the reasoner.
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    • 3.Classical Nyāya demonstrates that sajjña (perceptual recognition) requires no motivational state; inference, as another pramāṇa, should similarly suffice logically.
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