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    Intentional states are propositional attitudes — relation... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Intentional states are propositional attitudes — relations between individuals and propositions

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Russell conceived of each mental state as involving the individual's acquaintance with a proposition
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    • 2.The proposition is both what is understood when the state is reported and the content of the individual's state of mind
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Fodor's language of thought hypothesis shows mental content is sub-propositional and compositional at the level of mental representations.
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    • 2.If propositions are constructed from conceptual constituents in mentalese, the relation is between individuals and mental sentences, not abstract propositions.
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    • 3.Russell's acquaintance model presupposes abstract propositions as primitives, but this ontological commitment is independently contested by nominalists like Quine.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Phenomenal states like pain have intentional character yet resist propositional decomposition into subject-relation-proposition triads.
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    • 2.Chalmers and Siewert argue that phenomenal consciousness grounds intentionality, making propositional structure derivative rather than fundamental.
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    Chalmers and Siewert argue that phenomenal consciousness grounds intentionality,...Fodor's language of thought hypothesis shows mental content is sub-propositional...If propositions are constructed from conceptual constituents in mentalese, the r...Phenomenal states like pain have intentional character yet resist propositional ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Russell conceived of each mental state as involving the individual's acquaintanc...Russell's acquaintance model presupposes abstract propositions as primitives, bu...The proposition is both what is understood when the state is reported and the co...

    Similar

    Sentences expressing propositional attitudes (such as 'Seneca believed...82%The Relational Analysis entails that attitude-ascriptions of the form ...80%Desires, intentions, and attempts are not propositional attitudes as s...79%The proposition is both what is understood when the state is reported ...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: consciousness-intentionality
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    The development of externalist conceptions of intentionality informs the reception of Russell’s legacy in contemporary philosophy of mind as well. Russell also helped to put in play a conception of the intentionality of mental states, according to which each such state is seen as involving the individual’s “acquaintance with a proposition” (counterpart to Fregean “grasping”)—which proposition is at once both what is understood in understanding expressions by which the state of mind is reported,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit