Intermediate global supervenience requires that if worlds are B-indiscernible, some B-preserving map between them is also A-preserving, but this is a weaker existentialclaim about maps, not a universal one.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
(Modal supervenience relations between property families A and B across possible worlds)
If any B-preserving isomorphisms exist between two possible worlds, at least one of them must be A-preserving.
global supervenience(Modal supervenience relations in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
A globally supervenes on B if and only if no two possible worlds share the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties while differing in their global pattern of distribution of A-properties.
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction)
A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.
universal claim(as used in logic and argumentation)
A statement that says something is true in every single case with no exceptions, like 'all birds can fly.'