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    It does not follow from reasons being necessary for actio... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Challenges→The fact that reasons must cause actions in order to explain them does not entail that reasons cause physical behavior.

    It does not follow from reasons being necessary for action-explanation that reasons must cause behavior.

    CausationMoral Responsibility
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    Moral ResponsibilityCausation

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    Consciousness & Mind3 linked

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    Actions are not straightforwardly identical to physical behavior.Davidson rejects the possibility of analyzing action solely in terms of behavior...The 'because' argument holds that reasons must cause actions in order to explain...The fact that reasons must cause actions in order to explain them does not entai...

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    The fact that reasons must cause actions in order to explain them does...89%The 'because' argument holds that reasons must cause actions in order ...88%If reasons explain actions, they do so by causing those actions86%Davidson rejects the possibility of analyzing action solely in terms o...84%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    A key point to grasp in many of the issues raised by Anomalous Monism is that there is an important distinction between action and behavior. According to Davidson, action is intentionally described behavior—the moving of a hand through space in a certain way may, but need not, be an action of waving or swatting or any action at all. It may simply be mere bodily behavior—as happens as the result of a muscle twitch or a strong gust of wind. The behavior must be caused by an agent’s beliefs and des

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