It is just as easy to imagine inverted qualia in molecule-by-molecule duplicates (in the same external, physical settings) as it is to imagine inverted qualia in functional duplicates.
A scenario in which two individuals are identical in some relevant respect (functionally or physically) yet differ in their phenomenal experience — e.g., one experiences red where the other experiences green.
molecule-by-molecule duplicates(Contrasted with functional duplicates to probe physicalist commitments)
Two individuals who are identical at the level of every molecule and share the same external physical settings, constituting the strongest physical notion of duplication.
qualia(The passage presents two competing definitions to contrast the views)
On the Cartesian picture: intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which subjects are directly aware, necessarily shared by internal duplicates regardless of environment. On wide representationalism: representational contents of inner states whose nature is partly externally determined
Some philosophers will no doubt respond that it is still imaginable that you and I are functionally identical in all relevant respects yet phenomenally different. But this claim presents a problem at least for those philosophers who oppose functionalism but who accept physicalism. For it is just as easy to imagine that there are inverted qualia in molecule-by-molecule duplicates (in the same external, physical settings) as it is to imagine inverted qualia in functional duplicates. If the former