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    It would be wrong to say that, in a possible world where ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    It would be wrong to say that, in a possible world where it is false that p, there is no such fact as the fact that p.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If p is true in the actual world, then it is a fact that p in the actual world.
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    • 2.Facts and true propositions continue to exist across possible worlds.
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    • 3.A fact existing in a possible world does not entail that it is a fact in that world.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Facts are worldbound entities: to be a fact is to obtain in a specific possible world, not merely to exist abstractly across worlds.
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    • 2.If the fact that p fails to obtain in world W, then in W there is no fact that p—its non-obtaining just is its absence from W.
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    • 3.This follows from David Armstrong's truthmaker theory: facts (states of affairs) are what they are only by actually holding, not by hovering uninstantiated.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On a Russellian sparse ontology of facts, a fact exists only if its constituent relation actually holds among its constituent objects in the relevant world.
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    • 2.In a world where it is false that p, no relation-instantiation grounds the fact that p, so positing that fact's existence conflates abstract propositional content with concrete fact-existence.
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    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A fact existing in a possible world does not entail that it is a fact in that wo...Facts and true propositions continue to exist across possible worlds.Facts are worldbound entities: to be a fact is to obtain in a specific possible ...If p is true in the actual world, then it is a fact that p in the actual world.
    +4 moreShow less
    If the fact that p fails to obtain in world W, then in W there is no fact that p...In a world where it is false that p, no relation-instantiation grounds the fact ...On a Russellian sparse ontology of facts, a fact exists only if its constituent ...This follows from David Armstrong's truthmaker theory: facts (states of affairs)...

    Similar

    In the possible world where it is false that p, the fact that p exists...92%If p is true in the actual world, then it is a fact that p in the actu...87%Suppose the proposition that p is false87%Therefore p cannot be false.86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truth-identity
    View source passageHide passage
    Falsity, it seems, now no longer presents a difficulty, because if it is false that p then it is not a fact that p, so that (a) fails, and there is no appropriate candidate for the proposition that p to be identical with.[13] Notice that, in view of the considerations already aired in connection with the modal problem ((i) of this section), caution is here required. Suppose that it is true that p in the actual world, but false in some other possible world. According to the strategy that we hav
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit