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    Justifying induction by appeal to a theory accepted on in... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Quine's Darwinian justification of induction is circular

    Justifying induction by appeal to a theory accepted on inductive grounds is circular reasoning

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    Accepting Darwin's theory of evolution requires relying on inductive groundsQuine appeals to Darwin's theory of evolution to justify our native inductive te...Quine's Darwinian justification of induction is circular

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    Grounding the principle of induction in inductive reasoning itself wou...90%Appealing to an inductive argument to justify induction would be unacc...89%Quine's Darwinian justification of induction is circular86%The problem of circularity in Hume's argument about induction is evade...85%

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    A second standard objection to naturalized epistemology is that it gives up the project of answering the global skeptic and as a consequence fails to address, much less resolve, a central issue in epistemology. It must surrender this project because by operating within science it assumes that we already have some knowledge and hence begs the question against the global skeptic. For example, Quine appeals to Darwin to explain why our native inductive tendencies (used say in tracking the location

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