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    Kant does not assert that things independent from our rep... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Kant's transcendental idealism cannot be straightforwardly identified with idealism as the view that reality is ultimately mental in nature.

    Kant does not assert that things independent from our representations must be mental in nature.

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    Idealism, properly understood, is the position that reality is ultimately mental...Kant does not deny the existence of things independent from our representations ...Kant's transcendental idealism cannot be straightforwardly identified with ideal...

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    The first major philosopher actually to call himself an idealist was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), although as soon as he did so he labored to distinguish his position from Berkeley’s by calling his position empirical realism combined with transcendental idealism, by which he means that space and time are ineliminable properties of our experience and of things as they appear to us but not real properties of things as they are in themselves. However, since Kant neither denies the existence of things

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