Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Kaplan and Stalnaker's truth-conditional semantics assign... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→It does not follow from the normativity of assertion that meaning is normative.

    Kaplan and Stalnaker's truth-conditional semantics assigns meanings as functions from contexts to extensions without invoking any normative constraints on speakers.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    It does not follow from the normativity of assertion that meaning is normative.

    Details

    Type

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Explore a random proposition
    Start fresh with something unrelated.
    claim
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective