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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Keeping a secret necessarily involves auto-affection (spe... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Keeping a secret necessarily involves auto-affection (speaking to oneself).

    Consciousness & Mind
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.To possess a secret really, one must tell it to oneself.
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    • 2.Telling the secret to oneself is an instance of the structure of hearing-oneself-speak.
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    • 3.This internal self-address constitutes auto-affection.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Ryle's dispositional account shows that possessing knowledge (including secrets) requires no occurrent mental act of self-address.
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    • 2.A secret can be kept through behavioral dispositions and practical competencies that never involve explicit inner monologue.
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    • 3.If secret-keeping is dispositional rather than episodic, the auto-affective 'telling oneself' is neither necessary nor constitutive.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's private language argument demonstrates that meaning in any supposed 'inner speech' is parasitic on public linguistic practice, not self-sufficient auto-affection.
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    • 2.If inner self-address derives its semantic content from external, communal language use, then hearing-oneself-speak cannot be the foundational structure Derrida claims it is.
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A secret can be kept through behavioral dispositions and practical competencies ...If inner self-address derives its semantic content from external, communal langu...If secret-keeping is dispositional rather than episodic, the auto-affective 'tel...Ryle's dispositional account shows that possessing knowledge (including secrets)...
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    Telling the secret to oneself is an instance of the structure of hearing-oneself...This internal self-address constitutes auto-affection.To possess a secret really, one must tell it to oneself.Wittgenstein's private language argument demonstrates that meaning in any suppos...

    Similar

    To possess a secret really, one must tell it to oneself.83%To genuinely possess a secret, one must tell it to oneself, forming an...83%Telling the secret to oneself is an instance of the structure of heari...81%This internal self-address constitutes auto-affection.77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: derrida
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    Now, let us go to another “other place,” which can be found in “How to Avoid Speaking.” Here Derrida discusses negative theology by means of the idea of “dénégation,” “denegation” or “denial.” The French word “dénégation” translates Freud’s term “Verneinung.” Both words’ prefixes imply an emphasis of negation (although the French prefix also implies a negation of a negation). Yet, within psychoanalysis and in particular in Freud, the term ,“Verneinung” implies that when the patient denies a desi
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit