Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Kim argues that 'minimal physicalism' requires that menta... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Supervenience is required for minimal physicalism, whether the physicalism is reductive or non-reductive.

    Kim argues that 'minimal physicalism' requires that mental properties supervene on physical properties.

    CausationConsciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Consciousness & MindCausation

    Related

    Both reductive and non-reductive forms of physicalism must at minimum commit to ...Supervenience is required for minimal physicalism, whether the physicalism is re...

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consciousness & Mind
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Davidson holds that mental properties weakly supervene on physical pro...90%It is not clear why mental properties would weakly supervene on physic...85%Supervenience physicalism requires that mental facts supervene on phys...85%Supervenience is required for minimal physicalism, whether the physica...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: scientific-reduction
    View source passageHide passage
    Supervenience does not fare better, though for different reasons: It seems to be too weak a notion to capture the idea that guided reduction-talk, although it surely is a necessary condition for reduction. In a sense, if mental states merely supervene on physiological states, they exist in a straightforward sense over and above the latter. Such supervenient states are dependent; but being dependent is not enough for reduction (Kim 1998). Note that this is, up to a certain point, a matter of stip

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective