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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that KNA (Knowledge Norm of Assertion) does not adequately explain why unlucky and Gettiered assertions are appropriate

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.KNA's job is to specify which assertions are appropriate and which are not
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    • 2.Williamson's defense that unlucky and Gettiered assertions are 'reasonable' relies on general observations about rationality, not on KNA itself
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    • 3.Other norms such as JNA (Justification Norm of Assertion) can predict the appropriateness of unlucky and Gettiered assertions without appeal to independent epistemic standards
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Gettier cases reveal that knowledge and justified true belief come apart, so a norm requiring knowledge penalizes assertions that are epistemically identical to knowledge from the inside.
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    • 2.If KNA cannot distinguish first-personally between Gettiered and knowledge-level assertions, it fails as a norm governing the asserting agent's own epistemic conduct.
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    • 3.Lackey's 'selfless assertion' cases show that socially and epistemically appropriate assertions can be made without the asserter's own knowledge, undermining KNA's universality.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Turri's distinction between the 'rule' and the 'norm' of assertion shows that violating a constitutive rule need not entail epistemic blameworthiness, which KNA conflates.
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    • 2.Kvanvig's observation that understanding, not knowledge, tracks the communicative success of assertion suggests KNA targets the wrong epistemic state entirely.
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