Kripke's modalarguments in 'Naming and Necessity' show that proper names are rigid designators across possible worlds, a conclusion that generalizes the scope of direct reference beyond isolated cases.
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Logical arguments that deal with what is possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent (could have been otherwise).
possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized
proper names(as the type of words Frege's theory addresses)
Words that refer to specific individual things, like 'Socrates' or 'Paris'—as opposed to general words like 'man' or 'city' that could apply to many things.
rigid designators(in philosophy of language)
Words that always refer to the same specific thing in every possible situation, rather than changing their meaning based on context.