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Inverse View
It is not the case that Kripke's own essentialist arguments in 'Naming and Necessity' ground necessity in identity conditions that presuppose uniqueness of the kind's extension.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Kinds can have indeterminate or vague boundaries yet still possess genuine modal properties and fixed identity conditions.
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2.
The argument conflates epistemological access to extension with metaphysical requirements for identity; necessity doesn't require uniqueness.
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3.
Historical counterexamples show kinds (gold, water) have been reclassified while maintaining identity; extension uniqueness is too restrictive.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Kripke's rigid designators require stable reference across possible worlds, which demands determinate identity conditions for kinds.
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2.
Natural kind essentialism requires extension uniqueness; otherwise multiple distinct kinds could satisfy identical origin/composition properties.
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3.
If kinds lacked unique extensions, their modal properties would be indeterminate, making necessary truths about them unknowable.
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