Kripkean essentialism establishes that modal truths about kinds are grounded in the intrinsic properties of actual individuals across possible worlds, not in Platonic common natures.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
(The alternative view that Kripkean essentialism rejects)
An idea from the philosopher Plato that there are perfect, eternal templates or forms (like 'perfect Tigerness') that make all individual tigers what they are.
grounded in(whether distinctness or identity is explained by intrinsic features)
To be explained by or to have its reason or basis in something else—like how a tree being wet is grounded in (explained by) recent rain.
intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
kinds(Lowe's four-category ontology)
Substantial universals; a category of property in Lowe's ontology that objects instantiate.
possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized