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    L.J. Cohen's distinction between Pascalian and Baconian p... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence is significantly greater than one, undermining the argument that naked statistical evidence has no evidential value.

    L.J. Cohen's distinction between Pascalian and Baconian probability does not negate that naked statistics carry Pascalian probabilistic weight sufficient to shift posterior beliefs.

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    Key Terms

    Baconian probability(the other type of probability Cohen distinguished)
    A way of thinking about probability based on weighing evidence and reasons, rather than just pure mathematics. It's named after Francis Bacon and focuses on how strong the arguments are for something being true.
    L.J. Cohen(as a philosopher being critiqued)
    A British philosopher who argued against the idea that legal proof standards could be reduced to simple probability numbers, challenging the legal probabilist view.
    Pascalian probability(as the conventional probability theory Cohen critiques)
    The traditional mathematical approach to probability (named after mathematician Blaise Pascal) that assigns numerical odds to events using formal rules, often used in gambling and insurance.
    Posterior beliefs(as contrasted with initial beliefs)
    What you believe after you've learned something new; your updated beliefs after observing evidence.

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    shift (in belief)(what evidence does to your beliefs)
    To change your belief—either becoming more confident in something, less confident, or changing to a completely different position based on new information.

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

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    The likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence is significantly greater than...

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