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    Langton and Lewis define intrinsic properties as those sh... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The Langton and Lewis account fails as an account of qualitative identity interior properties

    Langton and Lewis define intrinsic properties as those shared by all duplicates, but modal properties like 'being such that 2+2=4' are shared by all duplicates trivially.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Trivially shared properties depend on logical necessity, not intrinsic nature, so they should be excluded from intrinsic property definitions.
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    • 2.A duplicate should share all and only properties grounded in its internal qualitative character, not abstract modal facts.
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    • 3.Langton-Lewis accounts distinguish intrinsic from relational by internal independence; modal necessities violate this independence criterion.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If duplicates share modal properties trivially, this reveals the definition captures something real about duplicates, not a definitional flaw.
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    • 2.Excluding trivially shared properties requires an independent account of 'triviality' that isn't circular or question-begging.
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    • 3.Mathematical truths like '2+2=4' are intrinsic to abstract objects; excluding them assumes a non-neutral position on mathematical ontology.
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    Connections

    1 linked claim · 2 topics

    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPersonal Identity1 linked
    The Langton and Lewis account fails as an account of qualitative identity interi...

    Related

    A duplicate should share all and only properties grounded in its internal qualit...Excluding trivially shared properties requires an independent account of 'trivia...If duplicates share modal properties trivially, this reveals the definition capt...Langton-Lewis accounts distinguish intrinsic from relational by internal indepen...
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    Mathematical truths like '2+2=4' are intrinsic to abstract objects; excluding th...The Langton and Lewis account fails as an account of qualitative identity interi...Trivially shared properties depend on logical necessity, not intrinsic nature, s...

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