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    Legal norms belong to the sphere of 'ought' — they are no... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Legal norms cannot be derived from purely descriptive facts about legal enactments without presupposing a foundational normative premise

    Legal norms belong to the sphere of 'ought' — they are norms that purport to guide conduct

    Philosophy of LanguageSocial Contract
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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A purely descriptive set of premises cannot yield a prescriptive conclusionAny argument concluding with a prescriptive statement must contain at least one ...Legal enactments and the actions constituting them belong to the sphere of 'is' ...Legal norms cannot be derived from purely descriptive facts about legal enactmen...

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    SEP: lawphil-theory
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    As Kelsen saw it, there is simply no alternative. More precisely, any alternative would violate David Hume’s injunction against deriving an “ought” from an “is”. Hume famously argued that any practical argument that concludes with some prescriptive statement, a statement of the kind that one ought to do this or that, would have to contain at least one prescriptive statement in its premises. If all the premises of an argument are descriptive, telling us what this or that is the case, then there i

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