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    Leibniz's Law applies only to genuine properties, but sor... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If object 'a' falls under sortal G and a = b, then object 'b' also falls under sortal G and is the same G as a

    Leibniz's Law applies only to genuine properties, but sortal membership is a Cambridge property sensitive to conceptual scheme, not an intrinsic feature of objects.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Cambridge properties (like being thought-of) change without intrinsic alteration, whereas genuine properties constitutively define objects' natures.
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    • 2.Sortal terms like 'person' or 'artifact' depend on human conceptual frameworks and purposes, not mind-independent intrinsic features.
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    • 3.If sortal membership were intrinsic, indistinguishable duplicates must share all sortals, yet we can conceive of identical matter classified differently.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Sortal properties constrain modal behavior and spatiotemporal persistence criteria that seem constitutive, not merely conceptual impositions.
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    • 2.The distinction between 'genuine' and 'Cambridge' properties lacks principled criteria; calling sortals non-genuine merely restates the conclusion.
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    • 3.If sortals aren't intrinsic, Leibniz's Law permits identical physical objects to differ only in conceptual labeling—undermining meaningful identity conditions.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Cambridge properties (like being thought-of) change without intrinsic alteration...If object 'a' falls under sortal G and a = b, then object 'b' also falls under s...If sortal membership were intrinsic, indistinguishable duplicates must share all...If sortals aren't intrinsic, Leibniz's Law permits identical physical objects to...
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    Sortal properties constrain modal behavior and spatiotemporal persistence criter...Sortal terms like 'person' or 'artifact' depend on human conceptual frameworks a...The distinction between 'genuine' and 'Cambridge' properties lacks principled cr...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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