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It is not the case that Lewis's counterfactual analysis treats causation as chains of counterfactual dependence, not bare sufficiency, yet still yields deterministic causal structure.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Counterfactual dependence in deterministic systems collapses into logical necessity, making causal claims indistinguishable from nomological entailment.
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2.
Lewis's framework struggles with preemption cases where a backup cause exists but doesn't actually operate, yet counterfactuals remain true.
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3.
Treating causation as chains of counterfactuals obscures how genuine causal powers operate in deterministic physics, reducing causation to modal fictionalism.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Counterfactual dependence captures causal direction by requiring that changes in cause necessitate changes in effect, excluding mere correlation.
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2.
Deterministic systems can exhibit genuine causation through chains of counterfactual dependence without invoking probabilistic or agent-based frameworks.
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3.
Lewis's account avoids circular reasoning by grounding causation in possible worlds semantics, making causal claims empirically testable.
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