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    Liberal Bayesianism, by permitting non-rule-based revisio... — Carmelics
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    Liberal Bayesianism, by permitting non-rule-based revision of prior probabilities, avoids van Fraassen's Dutch Book objection

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Van Fraassen's objection applies only to rule-governed ampliative inference
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    • 2.If no rules are stated for prior probability revision, the objection cannot target such revision
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    • 3.Some Bayesians accept that initial assignments and ongoing revision of priors based on plausibility arguments can be rational without rules governing them
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Van Fraassen's argument generalizes beyond rule-governed inference: any diachronic belief change that permits exploitation by a clever bookie is Dutch Book-vulnerable.
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    • 2.A Bayesian agent who revises priors without rules still faces a diachronic Dutch Book if those revisions are predictable or conditionally exploitable by an adversary.
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    • 3.Claiming immunity by refusing to state rules is epistemically evasive, not a principled solution—it concedes arbitrariness rather than refuting the objection.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rationality constraints in Bayesianism derive their force from coherence norms that apply to all belief states, not merely rule-governed transitions (Skyrms 1987).
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    • 2.If prior revision is permitted without any normative constraint, Liberal Bayesianism collapses into permissivism, undermining the very framework that makes Bayesian epistemology action-guiding.
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    • 3.Avoiding an objection by abandoning the standards against which the objection is measured is not a philosophical defense but a theoretical retreat.
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    Related

    A Bayesian agent who revises priors without rules still faces a diachronic Dutch...Avoiding an objection by abandoning the standards against which the objection is...Claiming immunity by refusing to state rules is epistemically evasive, not a pri...If no rules are stated for prior probability revision, the objection cannot targ...
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    If prior revision is permitted without any normative constraint, Liberal Bayesia...Rationality constraints in Bayesianism derive their force from coherence norms t...Some Bayesians accept that initial assignments and ongoing revision of priors ba...Van Fraassen's argument generalizes beyond rule-governed inference: any diachron...Van Fraassen's objection applies only to rule-governed ampliative inference

    Similar

    If no rules are stated for prior probability revision, the objection c...83%Van Fraassen's Dutch Book objection targets probability revision witho...80%Van Fraassen's Dutch Book objection targets rule-based confirmation, n...78%Likelihoodists, who reject Bayesian prior probabilities, may still emb...77%

    Source

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    SEP: reasoning-analogy
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    The criticism, made vivid by the tale of Bayesian Peter, is that these ‘ampliative’ rules are vulnerable to a Dutch Book. Adopting any such rule would lead us to acknowledge as fair a system of bets that foreseeably leads to certain loss. Any rule of this type for analogical reasoning appears to be vulnerable to van Fraassen’s objection. There appear to be at least three routes to avoiding these difficulties and finding a role for analogical arguments within Bayesian epistemology. First, ther
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit