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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Lisa's mental simulation of disgust does not constitute a mindreading event.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A mindreading event requires judging that another person has a certain mental state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Lisa undergoing a mirrored disgust experience (mental simulation) is a different mental event from judging that John is experiencing disgust.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, Lisa's simulated disgust experience is not an event of judging that John has a mental state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mindreading requires intentional content directed at another's mental state as its object, per Brentano's criterion of intentionality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mental simulation, as Alvin Goldman distinguishes in 'Simulating Minds,' produces a first-person state, not a third-person attributed state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A first-person simulated state lacks the 'other-directed' intentional structure necessary to constitute a representation of John's mind.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Shaun Gallagher's enactivist critique establishes that mirroring processes are sub-personal and lack the propositional structure of mindreading ascriptions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mindreading, on the theory-theory account, minimally requires forming a belief with the content 'S is in mental state M,' which simulation alone cannot produce.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.