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    Material objects as conglomerates of parts do not actuall... — Carmelics
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    Home/Perception
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    Material objects as conglomerates of parts do not actually exist as perceived

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dignāga's apoha theory shows perception of wholes is a conceptual overlay (kalpanā) projected onto bare sensory data, not direct object-contact.
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    • 2.Dharmakīrti argues only svalakṣaṇa (unique particulars) are causally efficacious; composite 'objects' lack this criterion and are thus conceptual fictions.
      ?

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    • 3.If the perceived whole were real, removing one part would require determining which part's removal destroys the whole—yet no such principled boundary exists.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka analysis shows that neither parts nor wholes can be located as the referent of perception without generating infinite regress or mereological incoherence.
      ?

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    • 2.The Abhidharma tradition's own commitment to mereological reductionism entails that macro-objects are prajñapti-sat (nominally existent), not dravya-sat (substantially real).
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Wholes are merely collections of minimal parts and do not actually exist as perceived
      ?

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    • 2.Extended objects must necessarily be composed of parts, with atoms as the ultimate building blocks
      ?

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    • 3.Atoms, conceived as partless point-instants, are ultimately insubstantial
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    Topics

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    Atoms, conceived as partless point-instants, are ultimately insubstantialCandrakīrti's Madhyamaka analysis shows that neither parts nor wholes can be loc...Dharmakīrti argues only svalakṣaṇa (unique particulars) are causally efficacious...Dignāga's apoha theory shows perception of wholes is a conceptual overlay (kalpa...
    +4 moreShow less
    Extended objects must necessarily be composed of parts, with atoms as the ultima...If the perceived whole were real, removing one part would require determining wh...The Abhidharma tradition's own commitment to mereological reductionism entails t...Wholes are merely collections of minimal parts and do not actually exist as perc...

    Similar

    Wholes are merely collections of minimal parts and do not actually exi...80%Considering objects as things in themselves by means of the categories...78%Physical objects do not exist independently of minds but consist solel...77%External objects (bodies) are nothing separated from representations o...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: mind-indian-buddhism
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    However, Vasubandhu's most compelling proof for idealism appeals to the method of mereological reduction: wholes, being merely collections of minimal parts, do not actually exist as perceived. But wholes, which are extended objects, must necessarily be made of parts, the ultimate building blocks of which are the atoms. And since atoms, conceived as partless point-instant are ultimately insubstantial, the realist argument for the existence of material objects as conglomerates of parts must b
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit