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    It is not the case that Matthen and Ariew (2002) argue that population-level statistical outcomes like drift are not causes but mathematical summaries of individual causal histories.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Statistical summaries can have causal relevance if they reliably predict and explain outcomes independent of underlying details.
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    • 2.Population-level drift produces emergent constraints on individual outcomes that individuals cannot violate—suggesting genuine causal efficacy.
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    • 3.If drift is 'merely' summarizing, it shouldn't be predictively superior to tracing all individual histories, but it demonstrably is.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Drift has no mechanism at the individual level—only birth, death, and reproduction occur. Drift is thus a description, not a causal force.
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    • 2.Mathematical summaries can be useful without being causal. Weather patterns summarize molecular motion without causing it.
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    • 3.Attributing causation to population-level abstractions commits a mereological fallacy: confusing properties of wholes with properties of parts.
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