McDowell's disjunctivist tradition holds that veridical perception and hallucination are not merely subjectively indistinguishable but are fundamentally different epistemic kinds, making the 'subjectively indistinguishable' condition in P2 epistemically irrelevant to justification.
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John McDowell is a contemporary philosopher who writes about how we perceive and understand the world through our senses and thoughts.
P2(Provides the truth conditions for proposition (7), identified as proposition (7): George Bush does not exist.)
The principle that proposition (7) is true if and only if George Bush does not exist — a modalized instance of the Tarski truth-schema 's is true iff s'.
Veridical perception(contrasted with hallucination in the statement)
Perception that accurately represents reality—when you see something and it's actually there and actually looks like that.
hallucination(philosophy of perception)
An experience that phenomenologically seems to be a direct presentation of an ordinary object but is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience of such an object.
justification(Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge)
The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.
subjectively indistinguishable(Used to characterize the relationship between hallucinatory and veridical experiences)
Indistinguishable by the subject 'from the inside'