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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Metaepistemological realism requires only that epistemic facts be non-arbitrary and agent-independent, not that they transcend all minds.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If epistemic facts depend on minds existing, then their truth-conditions seem contingent on a contingent fact—the existence of cognizers—which threatens objectivity.
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    • 2.Non-arbitrariness typically requires grounding in something non-arbitrary; if minds are the only ground, the regress of justification becomes circular at the foundation.
      ?

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    • 3.The distinction between agent-independent and mind-transcendent collapses under scrutiny: mind-dependence ultimately makes all facts agent-dependent in principle.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Agent-independence is logically distinct from mind-transcendence; facts can be independent of particular agents while remaining mind-dependent overall.
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    • 2.Epistemic facts about justified belief are non-arbitrary when grounded in rational norms, even if those norms are mind-constituted or conventionally established.
      ?

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    • 3.This view avoids both radical relativism (where anything goes) and implausible Platonism (where facts float free of all possible minds).
      ?

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