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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Metaphysical reductions must always be backed by apriori entailments between the base-level claim and the target claim.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Papineau and others argue physicalist reductions succeed via empirical identity claims, not conceptual analysis, making them irreducibly a posteriori.
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    • 2.Conceptual analysis of phenomenal terms like 'pain' systematically fails to yield apriori entailments from physical descriptions, yet physicalism may still be true.
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    • 3.If physicalism can be true despite the explanatory gap being unbridgeable apriori, then apriori entailment is not a necessary condition for metaphysical reduction.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's a posteriori necessities (e.g., water=H2O) constitute genuine metaphysical reductions without any corresponding apriori entailment.
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    • 2.If successful reductions exist that are knowable only a posteriori, then apriori entailment cannot be a necessary condition for metaphysical reduction.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The role of conceptual analysis is to show that a putative reduction respects the original meaning of the target expression.
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    • 2.A successful reduction must be answerable to our original shared understanding of the target expression.
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    • 3.Elucidating the original shared understanding of a target expression just is what conceptual analysis does.
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