Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Mind is a genuinely new quality in the world despite its ... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Mind is a genuinely new quality in the world despite its physical origins.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Mind descended on its physical side from lower forms of existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.When mind comes into being, it constitutes a new quality not present in lower forms.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A thing does not cease to be original merely because it is resoluble into more basic constituents.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If mental properties are fully determined by physical arrangements, they introduce no new causal powers beyond those physics already describes.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A property that adds no new causal powers cannot be 'genuinely new' in any ontologically significant sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Alexander's color analogy fails because colors, unlike minds, are not claimed to possess irreducible first-person causal efficacy.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Eliminative materialists like Churchland argue that 'mind' is a folk-psychological posit that mature neuroscience will replace, not vindicate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the concept of mind fails to carve nature at its joints, then emergence claims presuppose the very category they need to establish.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    A property that adds no new causal powers cannot be 'genuinely new' in any ontol...A thing does not cease to be original merely because it is resoluble into more b...Alexander's color analogy fails because colors, unlike minds, are not claimed to...Colour does not disappear merely because it is resoluble into vibrations of ligh...
    +5 moreShow less
    Eliminative materialists like Churchland argue that 'mind' is a folk-psychologic...If mental properties are fully determined by physical arrangements, they introdu...If the concept of mind fails to carve nature at its joints, then emergence claim...Mind descended on its physical side from lower forms of existence.When mind comes into being, it constitutes a new quality not present in lower fo...

    Similar

    When mind comes into being, it constitutes a new quality not present i...79%Deity is a superior quality that emerges from complex wholes, analogou...75%Physicalism is false, or at least committed to denying that Mary makes...75%Perceptions represent a special quality of presentness.75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: alexander
    View source passageHide passage
    [M]ind, though descended on its physical side from lower forms of existence, is, when it comes, a new quality in the world, and no more ceases to be original because in certain respects it is resoluble into physical motions, than colour disappears because it is resoluble into vibrations. (Alexander 1914: 304)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit