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It is not the case that Mixed strategy equilibria assume opponents know your mixing probabilities, but this epistemic condition rarely holds in real strategic interaction.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Mixed strategy equilibria describe rational play; epistemic requirements are about what rationality requires, not empirical psychology.
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2.
Players need only act *as if* they know mixing probabilities through trial-and-error learning and adaptation, not explicit awareness.
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3.
Some strategic contexts (sports, poker) involve repeated play where mixing probabilities converge to equilibrium through experience, not prior knowledge.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Empirical studies show players often use non-equilibrium strategies, suggesting they don't know opponents' mixing probabilities.
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2.
Real negotiators, competitors, and adversaries typically learn strategies through limited observation, not explicit communication.
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3.
Mixed strategy equilibria predict specific probability distributions, but players rarely have access to information precise enough to verify them.
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