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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Modal realism entails that there are no moral requirements.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.According to modal realism, the way things are in the broadest possible sense is not a contingent matter.
      ?

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    • 2.If the way things are in the broadest possible sense is not contingent, we cannot change it.
      ?

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    • 3.If moral requirements flow from a requirement to improve the way things are in the broadest possible sense, and we cannot change that, then there are no moral requirements.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Under modal realism, every possible action you could perform is already being performed by your counterpart in some possible world.
      ?

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    • 2.If every possible action is already actualized somewhere, the directive 'you ought to do X' cannot mean 'bring X into existence across modal space'.
      ?

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    • 3.Moral requirements presuppose that the agent's choice makes a difference to what exists, a presupposition modal realism systematically undermines.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lewis's modal realism treats all possible worlds as equally real and ontologically on a par, as argued in On the Plurality of Worlds (1986).
      ?

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    • 2.If the morally best outcomes and the morally worst outcomes are equally real across the plurality of worlds, no agent-neutral reason privileges actualizing one over another.
      ?

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    • 3.Frankfurt's and Wolf's accounts of moral responsibility both require that alternative possibilities carry genuine normative weight, a weight modal parity dissolves.
      ?

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