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    Moral considerations must be motivating in beings like us — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Moral considerations must somehow produce sensations of pleasure or pain in human beings

    Moral considerations must be motivating in beings like us

    Moral Responsibility
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    Moral Responsibility

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    Consequentialism1 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

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    SEP: kant-hume-morality
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    Even though we cannot know (or “make intelligible a priori”) how a thought or judgment about the morality of an action “can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain”, Kant thinks that this somehow does happen; it must, if moral considerations are to be motivating in beings like us. The phenomenology of respect is unusual, as it involves both pain and pleasure (or something like it). There is the humiliation an agent feels when the moral law strikes down her self-conceit; but respect also f

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