Moral evaluations — beliefs about what is good or bad, wrong or right — can be explained without supposing that they correspond to facts involving Moorean properties of absolute goodness or badness.
A highly influential British philosopher (1873-1958) who developed important ideas about how we know things and what words actually mean.
Metaethics(as the general field this statement appears in)
The branch of philosophy that asks questions about morality itself—like whether moral truths actually exist, or what makes something right or wrong.
Moorean properties(The target of the eliminativist argument in the passage.)
Non-natural properties of 'absolute' goodness or badness posited by G.E. Moore, understood as mind-independent metaphysical features of reality to which moral evaluations purportedly correspond.
moral evaluations(Used as the primary epistemic evidence that might be thought to support the existence of Moorean non-natural properties.)
Beliefs about what is good or bad, wrong or right.
The idea seems to be that our moral evaluations—our beliefs about what is good or bad, wrong or right—can be explained without supposing that they correspond to facts involving Moorean properties of “absolute” goodness or badness. And since our evaluations can be accounted for without supposing that there are any such properties, and since the only reason for we believing in them is the evidence of our evaluations, we have no reason to suppose that such properties exist, and some reasons (of an