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It is not the case that Moral objectivity can be established on purely naturalist grounds (e.g., Railton's reductive naturalism, Parfit's non-naturalism) without invoking theism.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Naturalism cannot bridge the explanatory gap between descriptive facts about nature and normative moral facts about 'ought'.
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2.
Reductive naturalism makes moral facts causally inert or collapses them into non-moral properties, undercutting objectivity claims.
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3.
Non-naturalist objectivity (like Parfit's) abandons naturalism's explanatory advantage, so the claim conflates two different positions.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Moral facts can reduce to natural facts about well-being, preferences, or flourishing without requiring supernatural foundations.
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2.
Theism fails to explain morality: the Euthyphro dilemma shows divine command doesn't ground objectivity or necessity.
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3.
Scientific and metaphysical parsimony favors naturalist explanations over theistic ones when both adequately ground morality.
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