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    Mutual confession is the solution to the Prisoner's Dilem... — Carmelics
    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Mutual confession is the solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the outcome on which play must converge when players are economically rational.

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract
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    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Player I's payoffs in every cell of the top row (confess) are higher than the corresponding payoffs in the bottom row (refuse to confess), regardless of what Player II does.
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    • 2.Because refusing to confess is strictly dominated for Player I, Player I will never choose that strategy.
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    • 3.After eliminating Player I's bottom row, Player II's payoff from confessing is higher than from refusing in each remaining cell.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Economic rationality, as Gauthier argues in 'Morals by Agreement,' includes the capacity to make and honor constrained maximization commitments.
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    • 2.A player who is transparent as a constrained maximizer can signal credible cooperation, making mutual refusal a rational equilibrium for such agents.
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    • 3.Therefore, the claim that economic rationality necessitates mutual confession presupposes a narrow Humean conception of rationality that is itself philosophically contested.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.In iterated or indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma settings, Axelrod's tournaments demonstrate that tit-for-tat strategies yield higher long-run payoffs than mutual defection.
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    • 2.The folk theorem in game theory establishes that cooperation is a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games when players discount the future sufficiently little.
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    • 3.The claim that mutual confession is the uniquely rational solution smuggles in a one-shot assumption that is empirically and theoretically unwarranted as a general account of rationality.
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    Topics

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract

    Related

    A player who is transparent as a constrained maximizer can signal credible coope...After eliminating Player I's bottom row, Player II's payoff from confessing is h...Because refusing to confess is strictly dominated for Player I, Player I will ne...Because refusing to confess is strictly dominated for Player II given the reduce...
    +7 moreShow less
    Both players are economically rational, meaning each will always choose strategi...Economic rationality, as Gauthier argues in 'Morals by Agreement,' includes the ...In iterated or indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma settings, Axelrod's tour...Player I's payoffs in every cell of the top row (confess) are higher than the co...The claim that mutual confession is the uniquely rational solution smuggles in a...The folk theorem in game theory establishes that cooperation is a Nash equilibri...Therefore, the claim that economic rationality necessitates mutual confession pr...

    Similar

    Predicting play consistent with QRE is motivated by the view that Nash...78%Both players are economically rational, meaning each will always choos...77%After eliminating Player I's bottom row, Player II's payoff from confe...75%The structure of the game gives Player I incentive to communicate trut...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    The players, and analysts, can predict this outcome using a mechanical procedure, known as iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Player 1 can see by examining the matrix that his payoffs in each cell of the top row are higher than his payoffs in each corresponding cell of the bottom row. Therefore, it can never be utility-maximizing for him to play his bottom-row strategy, viz., refusing to confess, regardless of what Player II does. Since Player I’s bottom-row strategy will nev
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit