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    Natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support ... — Carmelics
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    Natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation, where generalisations need not be exceptionless.

    CausationTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Natural kinds are identified by their role in supporting induction and explanation.
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    • 2.Generalisations in inductive and explanatory processes can have exceptions and still be scientifically valid.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Natural kinds require homeostatic property clusters or essential microstructural properties, not merely inductive utility (Boyd, Ellis).
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    • 2.A kind defined solely by inductive success conflates epistemic convenience with ontological category membership.
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    • 3.Scientific generalizations about non-natural groupings (e.g., 'jade') can support induction, proving inductive utility insufficient for natural kindhood.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Allowing exception-laden generalizations to define natural kinds collapses the distinction between natural kinds and mere nominal or conventional kinds (Kripke, Putnam).
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    • 2.If exceptionless laws are not required, there is no principled criterion to exclude gerrymandered predicates like Goodman's 'grue' from constituting natural kinds.
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    Related

    A kind defined solely by inductive success conflates epistemic convenience with ...Allowing exception-laden generalizations to define natural kinds collapses the d...Generalisations in inductive and explanatory processes can have exceptions and s...If exceptionless laws are not required, there is no principled criterion to excl...
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    Natural kinds are identified by their role in supporting induction and explanati...Natural kinds require homeostatic property clusters or essential microstructural...Scientific generalizations about non-natural groupings (e.g., 'jade') can suppor...

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: human-nature
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    There has, however, been a move in general philosophy of science that, if acceptable, would transform the relationship between the taxonomic and explanatory features of species. This move was influentially initiated by Richard Boyd (1999a). It begins with the claim that the attempt to define natural kinds in terms of spatiotemporally unrestricted, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions is a hangover from empiricism that should be abandoned by realist metaphysics. Instead, natural kinds s
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit