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    Ned Block's own conceivability arguments for inverted spe... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Individual qualia need not be functional in nature even if having some phenomenal character is functionally guaranteed

    Ned Block's own conceivability arguments for inverted spectra presuppose that qualia have intrinsic properties, but intrinsic properties of mental states are best explained by their causal-functional roles per Shoemaker's functionalist account.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.If qualia were merely functional roles, inverted spectra would be logically impossible since identical functional roles guarantee identical experiences.
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    • 2.Block's conceivability argument successfully shows we can coherently imagine spectrum inversion, demonstrating qualia transcend functional definition.
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    • 3.Functionalism struggles to explain why specific qualia feel the way they do rather than differently, suggesting intrinsic, non-functional properties exist.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; inverted spectra may be conceivable but impossible given our actual neurocognitive architecture.
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    • 2.Shoemaker's functionalism can accommodate intrinsic properties as constitutive of functional roles rather than separate from them, avoiding the dichotomy.
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    • 3.Block's argument assumes qualia have determinate intrinsic properties independent of all causal-relational context, a claim requiring further philosophical defense.
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    Key Terms

    Causal-functional roles(as how functionalism explains the mind)
    The idea that mental states are defined by what they do and how they connect to other things—like a belief matters because it causes you to act and connects to your other thoughts, not because of what it's made of.
    Conceivability arguments(as the argumentative strategy being discussed)
    A type of philosophical argument that says: if we can imagine or think through a scenario in our heads, it might tell us something important about what's actually possible in reality.
    Ned Block(as a philosopher studying consciousness)
    A contemporary philosopher who studies consciousness and the mind; he's known for arguing that our conscious experiences (like seeing colors) might be fundamentally different from what we can logically imagine or prove.
    Shoemaker, Sydney(as a major philosopher of mind)
    An influential philosopher who developed functionalism, the view that mental states should be understood by their causes and effects rather than their inner nature.
    functionalism(Philosophy of mind; distinguished here from representationalism)
    The view that mental states are defined by the causal roles they play in a cognitive system — their actual, potential, or typical causal relationships.
    intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
    Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
    inverted spectra(Contrasted with absent qualia to illustrate that the two possibilities are logically independent)
    The possibility that a functional duplicate of a conscious being has qualia that are systematically different in qualitative character — e.g., experiencing red where the original experiences green — while remaining functionally identical
    qualia(The passage presents two competing definitions to contrast the views)
    On the Cartesian picture: intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which subjects are directly aware, necessarily shared by internal duplicates regardless of environment. On wide representationalism: representational contents of inner states whose nature is partly externally determined

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Block's argument assumes qualia have determinate intrinsic properties independen...Block's conceivability argument successfully shows we can coherently imagine spe...Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; inverted spectra may be...Functionalism struggles to explain why specific qualia feel the way they do rath...

    Details

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    If qualia were merely functional roles, inverted spectra would be logically impo...Individual qualia need not be functional in nature even if having some phenomena...Shoemaker's functionalism can accommodate intrinsic properties as constitutive o...