- Causal-functional roles(as how functionalism explains the mind)
- The idea that mental states are defined by what they do and how they connect to other things—like a belief matters because it causes you to act and connects to your other thoughts, not because of what it's made of.
- Conceivability arguments(as the argumentative strategy being discussed)
- A type of philosophical argument that says: if we can imagine or think through a scenario in our heads, it might tell us something important about what's actually possible in reality.
- Ned Block(as a philosopher studying consciousness)
- A contemporary philosopher who studies consciousness and the mind; he's known for arguing that our conscious experiences (like seeing colors) might be fundamentally different from what we can logically imagine or prove.
- Shoemaker, Sydney(as a major philosopher of mind)
- An influential philosopher who developed functionalism, the view that mental states should be understood by their causes and effects rather than their inner nature.
- functionalism(Philosophy of mind; distinguished here from representationalism)
- The view that mental states are defined by the causal roles they play in a cognitive system — their actual, potential, or typical causal relationships.
- intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
- Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
- inverted spectra(Contrasted with absent qualia to illustrate that the two possibilities are logically independent)
- The possibility that a functional duplicate of a conscious being has qualia that are systematically different in qualitative character — e.g., experiencing red where the original experiences green — while remaining functionally identical
- qualia(The passage presents two competing definitions to contrast the views)
- On the Cartesian picture: intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which subjects are directly aware, necessarily shared by internal duplicates regardless of environment. On wide representationalism: representational contents of inner states whose nature is partly externally determined