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    No acceptable rule or set of rules for valid analogical i... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    No acceptable rule or set of rules for valid analogical inference has ever been formulated.

    Skepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Despite the confidence with which particular analogical arguments are advanced, no plausible candidate inference rule has been proposed.
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    • 2.This absence contrasts sharply with deductive reasoning and elementary forms of inductive reasoning such as induction by enumeration.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hesse's material analogy framework (1966) provides systematic criteria—causal relevance, similarity of structure—constituting a rule-governed account.
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    • 2.A rule need not be algorithmic or deductively certain to count as 'acceptable'; probabilistic inferential norms meet the standard for inductive logic.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The absence of a universally agreed-upon rule does not entail no acceptable rule exists; it may reflect philosophical disagreement, not logical impossibility.
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    • 2.Keynes's treatment of analogy in 'A Treatise on Probability' (1921) grounds analogical inference in a formal theory of evidential weight, constituting a serious candidate rule.
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    Related

    A rule need not be algorithmic or deductively certain to count as 'acceptable'; ...Despite the confidence with which particular analogical arguments are advanced, ...Hesse's material analogy framework (1966) provides systematic criteria—causal re...Keynes's treatment of analogy in 'A Treatise on Probability' (1921) grounds anal...
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    The absence of a universally agreed-upon rule does not entail no acceptable rule...This absence contrasts sharply with deductive reasoning and elementary forms of ...

    Similar

    The search for a simple, universal formal rule of analogical inference...89%A viable rule of analogical inference would need to be supplemented wi...88%A simple, universal rule of analogical inference is not viable87%Any viable rule of analogical inference would need to be supplemented ...87%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reasoning-analogy
    View source passageHide passage
    Argumentation theorists also make use of tools such as speech act theory (Bermejo-Luque 2012), argumentation schemes and dialogue types (Macagno et al. 2017; Walton and Hyra 2018) to distinguish different types of analogical argument. Arguments by analogy are also discussed in the vast literature on scientific models and model-based reasoning, following the lead of Hesse (1966). Bailer-Jones (2002) draws a helpful distinction between analogies and models. ” In brief, models are tools for predic
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit