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    No external object — whether conceived as a unified whole... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
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    No external object — whether conceived as a unified whole, as loose composite atoms, or as indivisible atoms in combination — is admissible as the object of cognition

    PerceptionSkepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Dignāga's apoha theory shows cognition grasps only conceptual exclusions (anyāpoha), never positive external referents directly.
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    • 2.If cognition operates solely through exclusionary concepts, no external object—whole, aggregate, or atom—can serve as its direct object.
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    • 3.Dharmakīrti confirms in Pramāṇavārttika that valid perception is self-luminous (svasaṃvedana), grounding knowledge in awareness itself, not external form.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā demonstrates that experiential content indistinguishable from object-directed cognition arises in dreams without any external object present.
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    • 2.If the phenomenal character of cognition is fully explicable without positing an external object in dream cases, parsimony demands the same explanation extend to waking cognition.
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    • 3.Positing external objects as cognition's objects introduces an explanatory redundancy that Occam's razor—and Vasubandhu's vijñaptimātratā principle—requires us to eliminate.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.A unified whole is not grasped as such apart from its parts
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    • 2.Loose composite atoms are not perceived individually one by one
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    • 3.Indivisible atoms in combination cannot be proved to exist as indivisible
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    Topics

    SkepticismPerception

    Connections

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    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A unified whole is not grasped as such apart from its partsDharmakīrti confirms in Pramāṇavārttika that valid perception is self-luminous (...Dignāga's apoha theory shows cognition grasps only conceptual exclusions (anyāpo...If cognition operates solely through exclusionary concepts, no external object—w...
    +5 moreShow less
    If the phenomenal character of cognition is fully explicable without positing an...Indivisible atoms in combination cannot be proved to exist as indivisibleLoose composite atoms are not perceived individually one by onePositing external objects as cognition's objects introduces an explanatory redun...Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā demonstrates that experiential content indistinguishable ...

    Similar

    An external sense-object cannot be the intentional object of cognition...86%An external sense-object cannot be the intentional object of cognition...86%An external sense-object cannot be the intentional object of cognition...85%Nowhere is an external object grasped as a unity or whole apart from i...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: twotruths-india
    View source passageHide passage
    Of the three alternatives: (1) points to the unity of a thing conceived as a whole; and (2) and (3) point to the multiplicity looking at the things as loose atoms, i.e., composite atoms. Not one of the three possibilities is, on Yogācāra’s account, admissible as the object of cognition however. The first is inadmissible because nowhere an external object is grasped as a unity, whole, one apart from its parts ([ĀlamPV] Tshad ma ce 86b). The second is inadmissible because when we see things we fin
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit