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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    No judgment can be called purely just in the present moment — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    No judgment can be called purely just in the present moment

    Justice & PunishmentSkepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Strict calculation—mechanically following a code—is unjust because it ignores the singularity of the case
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    • 2.Pure arbitrariness—ignoring codes entirely—is also unjust
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    • 3.Every decision necessarily involves both calculation and the unregulated re-institution of the law
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rawls's reflective equilibrium demonstrates that judgments can achieve principled coherence between rules and particular cases without residual injustice.
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    • 2.If a decision satisfies all relevant principles after careful deliberation, the absence of a perfect procedure does not entail the presence of injustice.
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    • 3.Derrida's argument conflates the epistemic difficulty of certifying justice with the metaphysical impossibility of its realization.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's account of epieikeia shows that equity corrects legal universality by attending to particulars, producing judgments that are fully just rather than merely less unjust.
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    • 2.The existence of a practical virtue specifically enabling just particular judgments refutes the claim that calculation and singularity are irreconcilable sources of injustice.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentSkepticism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility3 linked

    Related

    Aristotle's account of epieikeia shows that equity corrects legal universality b...Derrida's argument conflates the epistemic difficulty of certifying justice with...Every decision necessarily involves both calculation and the unregulated re-inst...If a decision satisfies all relevant principles after careful deliberation, the ...
    +5 moreShow less
    Pure arbitrariness—ignoring codes entirely—is also unjustRawls's reflective equilibrium demonstrates that judgments can achieve principle...Strict calculation—mechanically following a code—is unjust because it ignores th...The existence of a practical virtue specifically enabling just particular judgme...What involves both forms of injustice cannot be purely just

    Similar

    There must be immediate judgments80%Certainty in the context of immediate judgments must be taken in a sub...78%The existence of mediated judgments entails the existence of immediate...74%Suspension of judgment does not lead to inaction or make life impossib...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: derrida
    View source passageHide passage
    Derrida calls the first aporia, “the epoche of the rule” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, pp. 22–23). Our most common axiom in ethical or political thought is that to be just or unjust and to exercise justice, one must be free and responsible for one’s actions and decisions. Here Derrida in effect is asking: what is freedom. On the one hand, freedom consists in following a rule; but in the case of justice, we would say that a judgment that simply followed the law was only right, n
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit