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    No parallel distinction operates at the molecular level: ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Anti-functionalist physicalists lack a principled reason to reject inverted qualia between functional duplicates while accepting that inverted qualia between molecule-by-molecule duplicates are metaphysically impossible.

    No parallel distinction operates at the molecular level: if two systems share every microphysical property in the same environment, Leibniz's Law entails they share every property, including phenomenal ones.

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    Key Terms

    Leibniz's Law(Applied here to show that relative identity generates contradictions when sortals are treated as univocal.)
    The logical principle that if a = b, then whatever is truly predicated of a is truly predicated of b (the indiscernibility of identicals).
    microphysical(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Relating to the smallest, most fundamental physical things—like atoms, molecules, and subatomic particles that make up everything.
    parallel distinction(as used in this argument about levels of physical reality)
    A similar kind of separation or difference that exists in one domain but is being compared to another domain.
    phenomenal properties(Used in the context of higher-order thought theory to refer to properties whose presence is explained by higher-order representations)
    The qualitative, 'what-it-is-like' features of conscious experience that characterize how perceptual states feel to the subject

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