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    No solution compatible with mutual economic rationality c... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Nash Equilibrium (NE) is both necessary and sufficient as a solution concept for finite perfect-information zero-sum games.

    No solution compatible with mutual economic rationality can exist other than the unique NE in such conditions.

    ConsequentialismModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityConsequentialism

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    If each player is playing a strategy such that neither can do better given the o...In a zero-sum game, any improvement for one player requires making the other pla...Nash Equilibrium (NE) is both necessary and sufficient as a solution concept for...

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    If a second valid solution exists, the original solution cannot be uni...80%Games with a unique Nash equilibrium have a uniquely determined soluti...77%If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome, that outcome must be ...76%Maximization holds that an alternative is rationally eligible if no ot...76%

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    We can specify one class of games in which NE is always not only necessary but sufficient as a solution concept. These are finite perfect-information games that are also zero-sum. A zero-sum game (in the case of a game involving just two players) is one in which one player can only be made better off by making the other player worse off. (Tic-tac-toe is a simple example of such a game: any move that brings one player closer to winning brings her opponent closer to losing, and vice-versa.) We can

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