Nominalist paraphrase strategies that eliminate property-talk from object-level discourse must reintroduce something functionally equivalent at the level of laws or natural kinds to preserve the explanatory structure.
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functionally equivalent(as used in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
Two things that work the same way or produce the same results, even if they're different in other ways.
laws (natural laws)(refers to whether the rules of reality would stay the same or change)
The fundamental rules that govern how the universe works, like gravity or the laws of physics.
natural kinds(Water is offered as a paradigm example of a natural kind individuated by microstructure)
Categories of things in nature that share an essential microstructure, used to ground essentialism about species and substances
nominalism(Metaphysics; opposed to realism about universals)
The view that abstract entities such as properties or universals do not exist, and that predicative facts must be explained without appealing to such entities.