- Mathematical sentences(what the statement is about)
- Statements written in mathematical language, like 'two plus two equals four' or more complex equations and theorems.
- criterion of ontological commitment(Used by Quinean nominalists to respond to the One Over Many argument, but also deployed in the singular term argument for platonism)
- A principle, associated with Quine, by which one is ontologically committed to the entities over which one's first-order quantifiers range
- fictionalist view(One variety of nominalism)
- A nominalist position according to which the Platonist claim (P) is not equivalent to the nominalist datum (N), treating apparent reference to universals as fictional or non-literal
- nominalists(as the subject of the statement)
- Philosophers who believe that only concrete, individual things exist (like this specific red apple), and that abstract concepts like 'redness' or 'justice' aren't real things—they're just words we use to group similar objects together.
- ontological commitment(Used to derive that literal truth of 'a is F' entails existence of a)
- The criterion by which acceptance of a sentence as literally true commits one to the existence of the objects referred to by singular terms in that sentence, provided the sentence cannot be paraphrased away.
- paraphrase view(One of two general nominalist strategies, contrasted with fictionalism)
- The nominalist strategy of holding that mathematical sentences are true but should be read via alternative paraphrases that do not commit the speaker to the existence of abstract objects.
- thin-truth-ism(Philosophy of mathematics and metaontology)
- A view on which existential expressions (quantifiers) like 'there is' are ambiguous, such that sentences like 'There are infinitely many prime numbers' can be literally true without committing to the existence of the entities quantified over.