Non-reductive physicalists like Jaegwon Kim argue that if mental properties are causally efficacious, they must be reducible—but Davidson's token identity fails to secure this, yielding epiphenomenalism rather than genuine mental causation.
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Reducible(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind)
Able to be broken down or explained in terms of something simpler or more basic; for example, saying 'water' is reducible to hydrogen and oxygen.
Token identity(in philosophy of mind)
The philosophical idea that specific individual instances of mental events (like your right-now feeling of pain) are identical to specific physical events in your brain, even if mental and physical properties seem different in general.
epiphenomenalism(philosophy of mind)
The thesis that mental states are causally inert — they do not explain or cause behaviour, which has a complete physical explanation
non-reductive physicalism(Philosophy of mind and special sciences)
The view that while all facts at a higher level are physically realized, the theoretical and conceptual resources adequate for the substrate or realization level are not necessarily adequate for the realized level