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It is not the case that Nozick and Quine's epistemic norms require that beliefs reliably track truth across modal environments, not merely in locally favorable conditions.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Nozick explicitly restricts tracking to 'nearby possible worlds,' not all modal space. Global reliability across all environments is too stringent.
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2.
Quine's holistic web of belief permits local empirical equivalence. His critique of analytic-synthetic distinction challenges claims about modal environments.
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3.
Requiring truth-tracking across all counterfactuals makes knowledge impossible: no cognitive system reliably tracks across radically alien scenarios.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Nozick's tracking condition requires counterfactual reliability: if p were false, S wouldn't believe it. Local success alone cannot satisfy this.
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2.
Quine's naturalism demands empirical adequacy across theoretical alternatives, not just explanatory convenience in actual circumstances.
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3.
Knowledge requires robustness against epistemic luck. Beliefs tracking truth only locally remain vulnerable to misleading scenarios we can't rule out.
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